

JULIUS HOBSON, et al., )  
 )  
 Plaintiffs )  
 )  
 v. ) Civil Action No. 76-1326  
 )  
 JERRY WILSON, et al., )  
 )  
 Defendants. )

Robert Wall, duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:

2. One of the principal purposes of the Black Nationalist COINTELPRO in Washington, D.C. was to divide Black and White activists in order to defeat or hinder their political efforts.

3. To carry out this purpose the Washington Field Office used informants in Black political groups to gather information concerning the membership, leadership, activities, and goals of the groups. This information was essential to the formulation of COINTELPRO actions against them and obtaining it for this purpose was a substantial motivating factor in the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations of the groups and their members. Exhibit A, the FBI headquarters communication initiating the Black Nationalist COINTELPRO, contained explicit instructions in this regard:





The activities of all such groups of intelligence interest to this Bureau must be followed on a continuous basis so we will be in a position to promptly take advantage of all opportunities for counterintelligence and to inspire action in instances where circumstances warrant.

\* \* \*

All Special Agent personnel responsible for the investigation of . . . [these] organizations and their memberships should be alerted to our counterintelligence interest and each investigative Agent has a responsibility to call to the attention of the counterintelligence coordinator suggestions and possibilities for implementing the program.

4. The Washington Field Office instructed informants to seek leadership positions in Black groups in order to influence group decision-making and facilitate COINTELPRO actions. The Washington Field Office also instructed informants not in leadership positions to speak out at group meetings and otherwise actively seek to influence the activities of the group in accordance with the desires of the FBI.

5. <sup>At approximately the same time as</sup> ~~Under~~ I coordinated the Washington Field Office effort under the Black Nationalist COINTELPRO, another Special Agent of the FBI Washington Field Office, Gerald T. Grimaldi, <sup>or worked on</sup> coordinated/a similar program directed against "New Left" groups, which had formed to oppose the war in Vietnam and promote other political causes. Most of the leadership and membership of New Left groups were White.

6. One of the targets of the Black Nationalist COINTELPRO in Washington, D.C. was the Black United Front (BUF). A target of the New Left COINTELPRO was the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, and also the National Mobilization Committee (NMC).

7. To my knowledge the FBI never received information that the BUF or the NMC was involved in any illegal activity warranting criminal investigation by the FBI.

8. In the Fall of 1969 the Washington Field Office sought to prevent the BUF from supporting anti-Vietnam War protest activities planned by the NMC. The Washington Field Office also sought to

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prevent NMC and other activists from joining forces with the BUF in order to accomplish the BUF's goals.

9. The Washington Field Office drafted a letter that was supposed to come from someone in BUF to white peace groups and the NMC in particular which purported to be a demand from BUF that the white peace groups pay a substantial sum of money, \$20,000 or \$25,000, to BUF for having their peace demonstrations in Washington, D.C. I remember working on the draft and I recall discussions in the office about whose signature we should put on the letter. We talked about using Julius Hobson but decided he was too well known; we seized on Doug Moore as someone who was associated with BUF over whose signature we could prepare this letter. It seems to me that the letter was sent to NMC headquarters either in New York or Chicago. The letter may have also been sent to Abe Bloom as the local contact person for NMC. The letter shown in Exhibit B of this affidavit is the letter in question.

10. The purpose of the letter was to keep black groups and white peace groups divided. The WFO's plan was to create dissention between the NMC and BUF and it was proposed that our informants within NMC would further this dissent by arguing over the BUF proposal, some taking one side in favor of meeting the demand, and some arguing that the demand should not be met, characterizing it as "extortion". This sort of effort to create dissention was in accordance with Bureau policy which was to disrupt both the New Left and the black groups and in particular to prevent their coming together.

11. A further example of such efforts at disruption occurred during major peace demonstrations when the WFO was asked to call bus companies and urge them not to agree to contract with peace groups for transportation to Washington, D.C. for demonstrations. Once a demonstration was underway, we would attempt to cause disruption by telling the bus drivers who were waiting to take their passengers home that a new meeting place had been agreed upon, thus sending the bus driver off to some far point in the city and separating him from his passengers and causing a lot of itl will. We also would hand out maps to out of town demonstrators which inaccurately depicted the location of critical points on a demonstration route.

~~I have read the foregoing statement and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.~~

~~Date: September 16, 1981~~

~~ROBERT WALL~~  
~~XXXXXX~~





12. Subsequent to the BUF demand letter referred to above, FBI informants within the NMC reported that Julius Hobson, a BUF member and a person of great interest to the WFO, had opposed the BUF demand and was willing to speak at the NMC rally coming up on November 15th. In response to this, the WFO began working on a press release to be sent to local newspapers which would purport to be from a leader in BUF and would call Hobson an "Uncle Tom" for not supporting BUF's demands. This COINTELPRO project is outlined in Exhibit E. I remember working on a draft of an article or press release about Hobson and his lack of support of the BUF proposal which characterized BUF as calling or implying he was an "Uncle Tom" on this issue. I remember that the afternoon paper, the Evening Star, picked up my article and it was published. The purpose of this FBI proposal was "to tarnish the image of Julius Hobson and create internal dissension within the ranks of BUF." (Exhibit E.) Approval for release of the fabricated news release was sought from FBI headquarters.


13. After the November 15, 1969 rally the Washington Field Office continued to seek opportunities to divide Black activists and white activists. I would always note in my reports on meetings received from my informants whether individuals at meetings were black or white. I understood this to be a subject of interest to the Bureau because it wished to know, among other things, whether there was any significant cooperation between blacks and white. Examples of such reports are attached as Exhibit G.

14. In addition, the Washington Field Office used its own Special Agents to discourage growth of Black political organizations such as BUF. WFO Special Agents Gerould Pangburn and John T. (Jay) Aldhizer made it their practice only to stop and accost and interview as many BUF members as possible so that other people would know that if you joined BUF you would get FBI attention and also to encourage BUF's fears that someone was informing on its activities to the FBI.

15. Throughout the time I worked on Racial Matters, including when I was coordinator of the COINTELPRO-Black Nationalist Hate Groups case, a principal supervisor of mine was Courtland J. Jones whose title was Security Coordinator and who ranked just below the Special Agent in Charge of the Washington Field Office. Jones was responsible for initialing all memos about security proposals that went from the Field Office to Bureau headquarters. An example is shown in Exhibits E and F.

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I have read the foregoing statement and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief,

  
ROBERT WALL

September 16, 1981





15. In addition, the Washington Field Office used its own Special Agents to discourage growth of Black political organizations such as the BUF. Washington Field Office Special Agents Gerould Pangburn and John T. Aldhizer made it their practice openly to accost and interview as many members of the BUF as possible, thus informing the Black community that joining the BUF, or similar Black organizations, would draw the attention of the FBI.

16. Throughout the period I was coordinator of the Black Nationalist COINTELPRO, a principal supervisor of mine was Courtland J. Jones, whose title was Security Coordinator, and who ranked just under the Special Agent in Charge of the Washington Field Office. Mr. Jones approved all the COINTELPRO actions described above and his written approval is indicated by his initials on Exhibits E and F.

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Robert Wall

Subscribed to and sworn before me this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 1981.

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Notary Public

My commission expires: \_\_\_\_\_





12. To create further division, the FBI then prepared a racist leaflet entitled "Give-Them-Bananas," which purported to be a communication from the NMC rejecting BUF's demand for money. Bearing the picture of a monkey, this leaflet was distributed both to BUF and NMC members by FBI Special Agents. A copy of the leaflet and the FBI documents concerning it are attached as Exhibit D.

13. Subsequently, informants in the NMC reported to the FBI that Julius Hobson, a BUF member, opposed the BUF money demand and was willing to speak at the NMC rally November 15. In response, the Washington Field Office sought FBI headquarters approval for preparation and dissemination to newspaper reporters of an article "worded as coming from a leader of the Black community, holding a high office in the BUF" labeling Mr. Hobson an "'Uncle Tom' who has sold out the interest of the Black community to white intellectuals and white radicals." The purpose of this FBI proposal was to "tarnish the image of Julius Hobson and create internal dissension within the ranks of the BUF." A copy of this Washington Field Office proposal is attached as Exhibit E. The fabricated news release was subsequently prepared by the Washington Field Office and approval for its release was obtained from FBI headquarters. In addition, the Washington Field Office sought and obtained headquarters permission for release of another false news release accusing the BUF of waging a fraudulent campaign against local churches in Washington, D.C. A copy of the two FBI-prepared news releases and the accompanying FBI memorandum are attached to this affidavit as Exhibit F.

14. After the November 15, 1969 rally the Washington Field Office continued to seek opportunities to divide Black activists and White activists. For this purpose the Field Office directed informants to report the racial composition of those attending political meetings so that the FBI would know whether significant cooperation between Blacks and Whites was occurring. Examples of these reports are attached as Exhibit G.





prevent NMC and other activists from joining forces with the BUF in order to accomplish the BUF's goals.

9. The Washington Field Office instructed informants within the BUF to instigate a demand that each person coming to Washington, D.C. to attend an NMC rally November 15, 1969, pay a \$1.00 tax to the BUF. The informants were successful in urging the BUF to adopt this demand. A letter and memorandum making this demand were drafted by FBI Special Agents, circulated to the BUF membership and leadership for approval and subsequently sent to Abe Bloom, a Washington, D.C. leader of the NMC. A copy of this letter and memorandum is attached to this affidavit as Exhibit B.

10. After instigating the \$1.00 "head tax" demand, FBI Special Agents in the Washington Field Office used informants to tell other groups, such as the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO), about it. The purpose of this FBI effort was to encourage the NWRO to make a similar demand on the NMC and to cause the BUF to resent competition from NWRO for NMC money. This effort was in accordance with FBI headquarters instructions contained in Exhibit A:

No opportunity should be missed to exploit through counterintelligence techniques the organizational and personal conflicts of the leaderships of the groups and where possible an effort should be made to capitalize upon existing conflicts between competing black nationalist organizations.

The involvement of the NWRO in this manner was approved by FBI headquarters, as Exhibit C indicates.

11. The Washington Field Office then sought to promote dissension within the NMC over the BUF head tax demand. Some FBI informants in NMC were instructed to urge NMC to meet the BUF demand, while others were instructed to oppose the demand as a form of "extortion." This, too, is accurately explained in Exhibit C, which also notes the Washington Field Office's assessment that the "division of opinion should create serious schisms within the NMC Steering Committee and between the organizations which it represents."





UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
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Defendants. )

AFFIDAVIT

Robert Wall, duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:

1. From March 1966 to April 1970 I was a Special Agent of the FBI assigned to the Bureau's Washington Field Office. From \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ I was assigned to a squad in the Washington Field Office responsible for conducting domestic intelligence investigations. { From \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ I <sup>believe I</sup> was the Washington Field Office coordinator for the FBI program known as "COINTELPRO Black Nationalist Hate Groups." } The purpose of this program, accurately described in Exhibit A to this affidavit, was "to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities" of Black groups.

2. One of the principal purposes of the Black Nationalist COINTELPRO in Washington, D.C. was to divide Black and White activists in order to defeat or hinder their political efforts.

3. To carry out this purpose the Washington Field Office used informants in Black political groups to gather information concerning the membership, leadership, activities, and goals of the groups. This information was essential to the formulation of COINTELPRO actions against them and obtaining it for this purpose was a substantial motivating factor in the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations of the groups and their members. Exhibit A, the FBI headquarters communication initiating the Black Nationalist COINTELPRO, contained explicit instructions in this regard:





The activities of all such groups of intelligence interest to this Bureau must be followed on a continuous basis so we will be in a position to promptly take advantage of all opportunities for counterintelligence and to inspire action in instances where circumstances warrant.

\* \* \*

All Special Agent personnel responsible for the investigation of . . . [these] organizations and their memberships should be alerted to our counterintelligence interest and each investigative Agent has a responsibility to call to the attention of the counterintelligence coordinator suggestions and possibilities for implementing the program.

4. The Washington Field Office instructed informants to seek leadership positions in Black groups in order to influence group decision-making and facilitate COINTELPRO actions. The Washington Field Office also instructed informants not in leadership positions to speak out at group meetings and otherwise actively seek to influence the activities of the group in accordance with the desires of the FBI.

5. While I coordinated the Washington Field Office effort under the Black Nationalist COINTELPRO, another Special Agent of the FBI Washington Field Office, Gerald T. Grimaldi, coordinated a similar program directed against "New Left" groups, which had formed to oppose the war in Vietnam and promote other political causes. Most of the leadership and membership of New Left groups were White.

6. One of the targets of the Black Nationalist COINTELPRO in Washington, D.C. was the Black United Front (BUF). A target of the New Left COINTELPRO was the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, <sup>and</sup> ~~also known as~~ the National Mobilization Committee (NMC).

7. To my knowledge the FBI never received information that the BUF or the NMC was involved in any illegal activity warranting criminal investigation by the FBI.

8. In the Fall of 1969 the Washington Field Office sought to prevent the BUF from supporting anti-Vietnam War protest activities planned by the NMC. The Washington Field Office also sought to

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FBI informants  
could not  
verify.





prevent NMC and other activists from joining forces with the BUF in order to accomplish the BUF's goals.

9. The Washington Field Office instructed informants within the BUF to instigate a demand that <sup>the peace groups pay</sup> each person coming to Washington, <sup>a substantial sum - \$5,000 - to BUF</sup> D.C. to attend an NMC rally November 15, 1969, pay a \$1.00 tax to the BUF. The informants were successful in urging the BUF to adopt this demand. A letter and memorandum making this demand were drafted by FBI Special Agents, circulated to the BUF membership and leadership for approval and subsequently sent to Abe Bloom, a Washington, D.C. leader of the NMC. A copy of this letter and memorandum is attached to this affidavit as Exhibit B.

10. After instigating the \$1.00 "head tax" demand, FBI Special Agents in the Washington Field Office used informants to tell other groups, such as the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO), about it. The purpose of this FBI effort was to encourage the NWRO to make a similar demand on the NMC and to cause the BUF to resent competition from NWRO for NMC money. This effort was in accordance with FBI headquarters instructions contained in Exhibit A:

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The involvement of the NWRO in this manner was approved by FBI headquarters, as Exhibit C indicates.

11. The Washington Field Office then sought to promote dissension within the NMC over the BUF head tax demand. <sup>The FBI</sup> Some FBI <sup>WFO proposed to promote dissension by using some</sup> informants in NMC were instructed to urge NMC to meet the BUF demand, while others were instructed to oppose the demand as a form of "extortion." This, too, is accurately explained in Exhibit C, which also notes the Washington Field Office's assessment that the "division of opinion should create serious schisms within the NMC Steering Committee and between the organizations which it represents."

FBI work on drafted the letter then informants were told to support it the idea was informants would support. A discussion about whose signature the letter should be prepared for. We decided Johnson best decided he was the well known. We thought of Ding Moore who we figured could be safely used. It seems to me the letter was sent to the National New Mohr Office. It may have been sent to Abe Bloom directly as well.





We missed directed buses at marches by going up to the bus driver & telling him there had been a change & go out to be somewhere or tell the people by maps the wrong route.

12. To create further division, the FBI then prepared a racist leaflet entitled "Give-Them-Bananas," which purported to be a communication from the NMC rejecting BUF's demand for money. Bearing the picture of a monkey, this leaflet was distributed both to BUF and NMC members by FBI Special Agents. A copy of the leaflet and the FBI documents concerning it are attached as Exhibit D.

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14. After the November 15, 1969 rally the Washington Field Office continued to seek opportunities to divide Black activists and White activists. For this purpose the Field Office directed informants to report the racial composition of those attending political meetings so that the FBI would know whether significant cooperation between Blacks and Whites was occurring. Examples of these reports are attached as Exhibit G.

I remember working on a draft of an article on Hobson's reaction to the reaction of the Wash. Star picked up my story.

But doesn't remember this

In my own report I would always note whether subjects were Black or White among the reasons





15. In addition, the Washington Field Office used its own Special Agents to discourage growth of Black political organizations such as the BUF. Washington Field Office Special Agents Gerould Pangburn and John T. Aldhizer made it their practice openly to accost and interview as many members of the BUF as possible, thus informing the Black community that joining the BUF, or similar Black organizations, would draw the attention of the FBI.

16. Throughout the period I was <sup>working</sup> ~~coordinator~~ of the <sup>matters including Black Nationalist</sup> ~~Black Racial~~ Nationalist COINTELPRO, a principal supervisor of mine was Courtland J. Jones, whose title was Security Coordinator, and who ranked just under the Special Agent in Charge of the Washington Field Office. Mr. Jones <sup>was responsible for initialing all</sup> ~~approved~~ all the COINTELPRO actions <sup>memos in the security field going to Bureau H.Q.</sup> described above and his written approval is indicated by his initials on Exhibits E and F.

Robert Wall

Subscribed to and sworn before me this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 1981.

Notary Public

My commission expires: \_\_\_\_\_

*We agreed  
try to give  
the impression  
that they  
were being  
informed but  
we were  
behind every  
mailbox.*





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Notary Public

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